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TABLE OF CONTENTS |
6 |
|
|
PREFACE:EXPLANATION, PREDICTION, CONFIRMATION |
8 |
|
|
Team A Formal Methods |
10 |
|
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THE NO MIRACLES INTUITION AND THE NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT |
11 |
|
|
1. THE NO MIRACLES INTUITION |
11 |
|
|
2. THE ‘NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT’ |
13 |
|
|
THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT1 |
22 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
34 |
|
|
CAUSATION, ASSOCIATION AND CONFIRMATION |
35 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
35 |
|
|
1. INTRODUCTION |
35 |
|
|
2. COHERENCE AS PROBABILISITIC ASSOCIATION |
36 |
|
|
3. CONFIRMATION |
38 |
|
|
4. CETERUS PARIBUS |
39 |
|
|
5. FOCUSED CORRELATION |
40 |
|
|
6. CAUSAL STRUCTURE |
42 |
|
|
7. CONCLUSION |
46 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
47 |
|
|
AN OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN ACCOUNT OF CONFIRMATION |
50 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
50 |
|
|
§1 CARNAPIAN CONFIRMATION |
50 |
|
|
§2 THE BAYESIAN APPROACH TO CONFIRMATION |
51 |
|
|
§3 LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE |
55 |
|
|
§4 CARNAP'S RESOLUTION |
56 |
|
|
§5 PROBLEMS WITH CARNAP'S RESOLUTION |
57 |
|
|
§6 A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE |
61 |
|
|
§7 THE BAYESIAN APPROACH REVISITED |
63 |
|
|
§8 OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY |
64 |
|
|
§9 OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN CONFIRMATION THEORY |
68 |
|
|
BIBILIOGRAPHY |
76 |
|
|
AN EXPLICATION OF THE USE OF INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION |
79 |
|
|
1. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF IBE |
79 |
|
|
2. HEURISTICS |
81 |
|
|
3. APPLYING THE LOGIC OF QUESTIONS: PRELIMINARIES |
83 |
|
|
4. TWO COMPARATIVE CRITERIA OF EXPLANATORY POWER |
84 |
|
|
5. APPLICATIONS TO SOME PERSISTENT QUESTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE |
86 |
|
|
A FORMAL LOGIC FOR THE ABDUCTION OF SINGULAR HYPOTHESES1 |
88 |
|
|
1 INTRODUCTION |
88 |
|
|
2 THE PROBLEM |
89 |
|
|
3 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF ABDUCTIVE REASONING |
91 |
|
|
4 INFORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE LOGIC LArs |
94 |
|
|
5 THE LOGIC LArs |
100 |
|
|
6 CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS |
102 |
|
|
PROBABILITIES IN BRANCHING STRUCTURES |
104 |
|
|
REAL AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES |
104 |
|
|
PROBABILITIES IN BRANCHING TIME |
108 |
|
|
EXTENDING THE ACCOUNT: BRANCHING SPACE-TIMES |
113 |
|
|
CONCLUSIONS |
115 |
|
|
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
115 |
|
|
Team B Philosophy of the Natural and Life Sciences |
117 |
|
|
CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION: ISSUES FROM EPIDEMIOLOGY |
118 |
|
|
1. EPIDEMIOLOGY PARADIGMS |
118 |
|
|
2. OVERCOMING THE BLACK BOX PARADIGM. THE SEARCH FOR MECHANISMS |
120 |
|
|
3. MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS OF LAYERED DISEASES |
124 |
|
|
INVARIANCE, MECHANISMS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY |
129 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
131 |
|
|
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE PRAGMATIC-ONTIC ACCOUNT OF MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION? |
133 |
|
|
1. INTRODUCTION |
133 |
|
|
2. WORRIES |
135 |
|
|
3. CONCLUSION |
142 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
143 |
|
|
CAUSALITY AND EVIDENCE DISCOVERY IN EPIDEMIOLOGY |
145 |
|
|
EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY |
145 |
|
|
NON-RANDOMISED EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES |
150 |
|
|
CONCLUSION |
156 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
157 |
|
|
INFERENCES TO CAUSAL RELEVANCE FROM EXPERIMENTS |
159 |
|
|
1 THEORY AND EXPERIENCE |
159 |
|
|
2 CAUSAL ANALYSIS |
160 |
|
|
2.1 Causal models |
161 |
|
|
2.2 Theory of causal regularities |
164 |
|
|
2.3 Principles of causal reasoning |
165 |
|
|
2.3.1 Method of Difference |
165 |
|
|
2.3.2 Assumptions |
165 |
|
|
2.3.3 Inferring a causal factor |
166 |
|
|
2.3.4 More complex designs |
168 |
|
|
2.3.5 Other inference patterns |
168 |
|
|
2.4 Difference tests in practice: notebook entries |
169 |
|
|
3 METHODOLOGY OF CAUSAL MODELS |
172 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
173 |
|
|
COMPARING PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY AND PHYSICS1 |
175 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
175 |
|
|
1. BIOLOGY, PHYSICS, AND NAGEL’S REDUCTIONIST SHADOW |
175 |
|
|
2. TEMPORALITY IN PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS |
179 |
|
|
2.1 Part-Whole Reductive Explanations |
179 |
|
|
2.2 Temporality |
179 |
|
|
3. COMPOSITION, CAUSATION, AND THE DIFFERENCE TIME MAKES |
181 |
|
|
3.1 Composition and Causation |
181 |
|
|
3.2 Intrinsicality and Fundamentality |
182 |
|
|
4. EXAMPLES: PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY AND PHYSICS |
186 |
|
|
4.1 Ideal Crystal |
186 |
|
|
4.2. Quantum-entanglement |
187 |
|
|
4.3 Protein Folding |
188 |
|
|
5. CONCLUSION |
191 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
192 |
|
|
THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST |
195 |
|
|
SOME HISTORICAL SCENE SETTING |
195 |
|
|
MISLEADING METAPHORS |
200 |
|
|
VARIATIONAL EXPLANATION AND FILTER DEVICES |
204 |
|
|
SOLVING SOBER’S PROBLEM |
210 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
212 |
|
|
THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST WHAT ? |
215 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
215 |
|
|
1. INTRODUCTION: DOES SELECTION EXPLAIN THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST? |
215 |
|
|
2. THE SIEVE ANALOGY OF NATURAL SELECTION |
216 |
|
|
3. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SIEVE ANALOGY: A FALSE DICHOTOMY |
220 |
|
|
4. WHAT NATURAL SELECTION EXPLAINS AND WHAT IT DOES NOT |
223 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
227 |
|
|
Team C Philosophy of theCultural and Social Sciences |
230 |
|
|
NORMATIVITY IS THE KEY TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES |
231 |
|
|
1. WHERE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES IS NOT |
231 |
|
|
2. NORMATIVITY IN AN EXTERNAL AND AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE |
234 |
|
|
3. HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES DIFFER IN NORMATIVE INVOLVEMENT |
236 |
|
|
4. IS METHODOLOGICAL DUALISM COMPATIBLE WITH ONTOLOGICAL MONISM? |
239 |
|
|
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
241 |
|
|
METHODOLOGICAL HIGHER-LEVEL INTERDISCIPLINARITY BY SCHEME-INTERPRETATIONISM: AGAINST METHODOLOGICAL SEPARATISM OF THE NATURAL, SOCIAL, AND HUMAN SCIENCES |
242 |
|
|
I. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN THE INFORMATION- ANDSYSTEMS TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD |
242 |
|
|
II. THE TRADITIONAL “TWO CULTURES” PROBLEM |
243 |
|
|
III. TYPES OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY |
244 |
|
|
IV. TOWARDS A SYSTEMATIC SCHEME-INTERPRETATIONISM |
247 |
|
|
V. INTERPRETATION AND HERMENEUTICS |
252 |
|
|
EXPLANATION AND INTERPRETATION IN THE SCIENCES OF MAN |
257 |
|
|
EXPLANATION AS AN ACT OF COMMUNICATION |
258 |
|
|
EXPLANATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES |
260 |
|
|
INTERPRETATION IN CONTEXT |
263 |
|
|
CONCLUSION |
267 |
|
|
IMAGINATION AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY |
268 |
|
|
I. THE MOMENTS OF HISTORICAL MEMORY |
269 |
|
|
1. Personal Memory |
269 |
|
|
2. Interpretation of the Human Traces |
270 |
|
|
3. The Capacity for Storytelling |
272 |
|
|
4. The Connection of Personal Memory and Collective Memory |
275 |
|
|
II. NEW LIGHT ON EXPLANATION |
276 |
|
|
HISTORICAL NARRATIVES, EVIDENCE, AND EXPLANATIONS |
279 |
|
|
HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND EVIDENCE |
279 |
|
|
THE LOGIC OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE |
282 |
|
|
SCIENTIFIC LAWS AND COMMON SENSE GENERALIZATIONS |
286 |
|
|
HOLISTIC SOCIAL CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION |
290 |
|
|
I. INTRODUCTION |
290 |
|
|
II. INDIVIDUALISTIC VERSUS HOLISTIC PREDICATES AND CONCEPTS |
291 |
|
|
III. THE SOCIAL CAUSATION PROBLEM |
294 |
|
|
IV. ARGUING FOR HOLISTIC SOCIAL CAUSATION |
298 |
|
|
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS |
301 |
|
|
COMPLEXITY IN ECONOMICS AND PREDICTION: THE ROLE OF PARSIMONIOUS FACTORS1 |
304 |
|
|
1. SOURCES OF COMPLEXITY FOR ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS |
305 |
|
|
2. VARIETIES OF COMPLEXITY: FRAMEWORK AND DYNAMICS |
306 |
|
|
2.1. Complex Framework and Complex Dynamics |
307 |
|
|
2.2. Relevant Forms of Complexity |
309 |
|
|
3. THE ROLE OF PARSIMONIOUS FACTORS |
310 |
|
|
3.1. Identifi cation of Parsimonious Factors |
311 |
|
|
3.2. Contribution of Parsimonious Factors |
313 |
|
|
PREDICTION AND PRESCRIPTION IN THE SCIENCE OF THE ARTIFICIAL: INFORMATION SCIENCE AND COMPLEXITY1 |
316 |
|
|
1. COMPLEXITY IN DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS |
317 |
|
|
1.1. Understanding the Complexity of a System |
318 |
|
|
1.2. Interaction in the System |
319 |
|
|
2. DIFFICULTIES FOR PREDICTION IN THE DESIGN OF INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS |
321 |
|
|
2.1. Kinds of Uncertainty |
322 |
|
|
2.2. Scientific Design and the Management of Uncertainty Problems |
323 |
|
|
3. THE NEED FOR PRESCRIPTION IN AN INFORMATIVE ENVIRONMENT |
324 |
|
|
3.1. Prescription in the “Inner” Level |
324 |
|
|
3.2. The “Outer” Sphere of Prescriptions |
325 |
|
|
Team D Philosophy of the Physical Sciences |
329 |
|
|
AGAINST POINTILLISME: A CALL TO ARMS |
330 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
330 |
|
|
1 INTRODUCTION |
330 |
|
|
1.1 Five kinds of spatial extrinsicality |
332 |
|
|
2.1 Avoiding controversy about the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction |
334 |
|
|
2 THE WIDER CAMPAIGN AGAINST POINTILLISME |
334 |
|
|
2.1.1 Distinction from three mathematical distinctions |
334 |
|
|
2.2 Classical mechanics is not pointilliste |
336 |
|
|
2.2.1 Two versions of pointillisme |
336 |
|
|
2.2.2 Mechanics violates pointillisme as regards space |
337 |
|
|
3 STRESS: EXTRINSICALITY FROM A TENSOR’S ORDER |
338 |
|
|
3.1 The need for surface forces |
339 |
|
|
3.2 The stress tensor |
340 |
|
|
4 STRAIN: HAECCEITIST KINEMATICS |
341 |
|
|
4.1 The description of deformations |
342 |
|
|
4.2 The Cauchy-Green strain tensor |
343 |
|
|
5 ELASTICITY: FURTHER ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF EXTRINSICALITY |
344 |
|
|
6 CONCLUSION: YET MORE EXTRINSICALITY |
345 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
346 |
|
|
THE GIBBS PARADOX REVISITED |
349 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
349 |
|
|
1 INTRODUCTION: THE GIBBS PARADOX |
349 |
|
|
2 THE GIBBS PARADOX IN STATISTICAL MECHANICS |
350 |
|
|
3 THE STATISTICAL MECHANICAL ENTROPY OF MIXING |
352 |
|
|
4 A NEW DILEMMA: THE GIBBS PARADOX IN QUANTUM MECHANICS |
353 |
|
|
5 HOW PARTICLES ARE TO BE REPRESENTED IN QUANTUM MECHANICS |
355 |
|
|
6 PARTICLES AS EMERGENT ENTITIES |
357 |
|
|
7 THE GIBBS PARADOX: CONCLUSION |
358 |
|
|
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
359 |
|
|
THE ALEXANDROFF PRESENT AND MINKOWSKI SPACETIME: WHY IT CANNOT DO WHAT IT HAS BEEN ASKED TO DO1 |
360 |
|
|
1 SAVITT’S TWO MOTIVATIONS FOR HAVING A PRESENT IN MINKOWSKI SPACETIME |
361 |
|
|
2 ALEX’S FEATURES IN RELATION TO THE EXTENDED CHARACTER OF OUR EXPERIENCE |
363 |
|
|
3 ALEX’S OSCILLATION BETWEEN ITS USELESSNESS IN PHYSICS AND ITS UNFAITHFULNESS TO OUR EXPERIENCE |
366 |
|
|
4 THE PHYSICAL IRRELEVANCE OF ALEX |
370 |
|
|
5 ANOTHER MODEL OF THE PRESENT OF OUR EXPERIENCE? |
372 |
|
|
6 CONCLUSION |
374 |
|
|
A LOCUS FOR “NOW” |
376 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
376 |
|
|
1 MAIN INTUITION |
377 |
|
|
1.1 Models of BST |
380 |
|
|
1.2 Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS) |
382 |
|
|
2 WHAT DO THE PRESENTS LOOK LIKE? |
385 |
|
|
3 DISCUSSION |
387 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
390 |
|
|
WEYL’S PRINCIPLE, COSMIC TIME AND QUANTUM FUNDAMENTALISM |
392 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
392 |
|
|
1 INTRODUCTION |
392 |
|
|
2 A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF WEYL’S PRINCIPLE |
393 |
|
|
3 WEYL’S PRINCIPLE IN STANDARD TEXTS ON COSMOLOGY |
396 |
|
|
4 COSMIC TIME WITH QUANTUM MATTER? |
401 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
404 |
|
|
NOT THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATHWATER: BELL’S CONDITION OF LOCAL CAUSALITY MATHEMATICALLY ‘SHARP AND CLEAN’ |
406 |
|
|
ABSTRACT |
406 |
|
|
I. INTRODUCTION |
406 |
|
|
II. THE INTUITIVE IDEA: BELL’S LOCAL CAUSALITY |
407 |
|
|
III. CLEANING UP THE INTUITIVE IDEA |
411 |
|
|
IV. INTRODUCING MATHEMATICS: FORMALIZING SUFFICIENCY |
419 |
|
|
V. THE BABY: BELL’S LOCAL CAUSALITY ‘MATHEMATICALLY SHARP AND CLEAN’ |
425 |
|
|
VI. NOT THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATHWATER |
426 |
|
|
VII. ENVOI |
430 |
|
|
REFERENCES |
430 |
|
|
Team E History of the Philosophy of Science |
432 |
|
|
KANT ON CHANCE AND EXPLANATION |
433 |
|
|
1. INTRODUCTION |
433 |
|
|
2. KANT ON CHANCE |
434 |
|
|
3. THE CHANCE HYPOTHESIS |
437 |
|
|
4. WHY IS CHANCE ILLEGITIMATE? |
439 |
|
|
5. KANT ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD |
441 |
|
|
6. CONCLUSION |
443 |
|
|
SHIFTING THE (NON-RELATIVIZED) A PRIORI: HANS REICHENBACH ON CAUSALITY AND PROBABILITY (1915–1932) |
444 |
|
|
1. TWO SYNTHETIC APRIORIS: THE EARLY REICHENBACH |
446 |
|
|
2. YEARS OF TRANSITION: THE MID 1920S |
447 |
|
|
3. INDUCTIVE INFERENCE AS AN A PRIORI |
452 |
|
|
4. POST EMIGRATION: ABANDONING THE UNITY OF STATISTICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS |
454 |
|
|
CARNAP’S THEORIES OF CONFIRMATION |
455 |
|
|
THE RISE AND FALL OF FALSIFICATIONISM IN THE LIGHT OF NEURATH’S CRITICISM1 |
465 |
|
|
1. INTRODUCTION |
465 |
|
|
2. THE CRITIQUE OF DOGMATIC FALSIFICATIONISM |
467 |
|
|
3. THE DECISIONISM OF POPPER1 |
470 |
|
|
4. SOPHISTICATED FALSIFICATIONISM |
472 |
|
|
5. THE REJECTION OF THE MAIN IDEAS OF FALSIFICATIONISM |
474 |
|
|
6. CONCLUSION |
476 |
|
|
PROBABILITY AND PRAGMATISM |
477 |
|
|
1. FOREWORD |
477 |
|
|
2. ABOUT PRAGMATISM |
477 |
|
|
3. PEIRCE FORERUNNER OF THE PROPENSITY INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY |
479 |
|
|
4. THE INFLUENCE OF PRAGMATISM ON HANS REICHENBACH |
480 |
|
|
5. LEWIS’S INFLUENCE ON CARNAP |
483 |
|
|
6. THE SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY |
484 |
|
|
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS |
487 |
|
|
RUSSELL ON NON-DEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE |
489 |
|
|
INTRODUCTION |
489 |
|
|
1. THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION |
491 |
|
|
2. THE POSTULATES OF NON-DEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE |
492 |
|
|
3. KNOWLEDGE OF THE POSTULATES: HIGHER-ORDER NATURALISM? |
494 |
|
|
4. THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICISM |
496 |
|
|
EDGAR ZILSEL ON HISTORICAL LAWS |
499 |
|
|
“EVERY SYSTEM OF SCIENTIFIC THEORY INVOLVES PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS” (TALCOTT PARSONS). THE SURPRISING WEBERIAN ROOTS TO MILTON FRIEDMAN’S METHODOLOGY |
511 |
|
|
INTRODUCTION |
511 |
|
|
1. STIGLER’S INTEREST IN PARSONS |
513 |
|
|
2. PARSONS AND CHICAGO |
517 |
|
|
INDEX OF NAMES |
522 |
|