TABLE OF CONTENTS	6
	PREFACE:EXPLANATION, PREDICTION, CONFIRMATION	8
	Team A Formal Methods	10
	THE NO MIRACLES INTUITION AND THE NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT	11
	1. THE NO MIRACLES INTUITION	11
	2. THE ‘NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT’	13
	THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT1	22
	REFERENCES	34
	CAUSATION, ASSOCIATION AND CONFIRMATION	35
	ABSTRACT	35
	1. INTRODUCTION	35
	2. COHERENCE AS PROBABILISITIC ASSOCIATION	36
	3. CONFIRMATION	38
	4. CETERUS PARIBUS	39
	5. FOCUSED CORRELATION	40
	6. CAUSAL STRUCTURE	42
	7. CONCLUSION	46
	REFERENCES	47
	AN OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN ACCOUNT OF CONFIRMATION	50
	ABSTRACT	50
	§1 CARNAPIAN CONFIRMATION	50
	§2 THE BAYESIAN APPROACH TO CONFIRMATION	51
	§3 LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE	55
	§4 CARNAP'S RESOLUTION	56
	§5 PROBLEMS WITH CARNAP'S RESOLUTION	57
	§6 A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE	61
	§7 THE BAYESIAN APPROACH REVISITED	63
	§8 OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY	64
	§9 OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN CONFIRMATION THEORY	68
	BIBILIOGRAPHY	76
	AN EXPLICATION OF THE USE OF INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION	79
	1. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF IBE	79
	2. HEURISTICS	81
	3. APPLYING THE LOGIC OF QUESTIONS: PRELIMINARIES	83
	4. TWO COMPARATIVE CRITERIA OF EXPLANATORY POWER	84
	5. APPLICATIONS TO SOME PERSISTENT QUESTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE	86
	A FORMAL LOGIC FOR THE ABDUCTION OF SINGULAR HYPOTHESES1	88
	1 INTRODUCTION	88
	2 THE PROBLEM	89
	3 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF ABDUCTIVE REASONING	91
	4 INFORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE LOGIC LArs	94
	5 THE LOGIC LArs	100
	6 CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS	102
	PROBABILITIES IN BRANCHING STRUCTURES	104
	REAL AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES	104
	PROBABILITIES IN BRANCHING TIME	108
	EXTENDING THE ACCOUNT: BRANCHING SPACE-TIMES	113
	CONCLUSIONS	115
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	115
	Team B Philosophy of the Natural and Life Sciences	117
	CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION: ISSUES FROM EPIDEMIOLOGY	118
	1. EPIDEMIOLOGY PARADIGMS	118
	2. OVERCOMING THE BLACK BOX PARADIGM. THE SEARCH FOR MECHANISMS	120
	3. MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS OF LAYERED DISEASES	124
	INVARIANCE, MECHANISMS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY	129
	REFERENCES	131
	WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE PRAGMATIC-ONTIC ACCOUNT OF MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION?	133
	1. INTRODUCTION	133
	2. WORRIES	135
	3. CONCLUSION	142
	REFERENCES	143
	CAUSALITY AND EVIDENCE DISCOVERY IN EPIDEMIOLOGY	145
	EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY	145
	NON-RANDOMISED EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES	150
	CONCLUSION	156
	REFERENCES	157
	INFERENCES TO CAUSAL RELEVANCE FROM EXPERIMENTS	159
	1 THEORY AND EXPERIENCE	159
	2 CAUSAL ANALYSIS	160
	2.1 Causal models	161
	2.2 Theory of causal regularities	164
	2.3 Principles of causal reasoning	165
	2.3.1 Method of Difference	165
	2.3.2 Assumptions	165
	2.3.3 Inferring a causal factor	166
	2.3.4 More complex designs	168
	2.3.5 Other inference patterns	168
	2.4 Difference tests in practice: notebook entries	169
	3 METHODOLOGY OF CAUSAL MODELS	172
	REFERENCES	173
	COMPARING PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY AND PHYSICS1	175
	ABSTRACT	175
	1. BIOLOGY, PHYSICS, AND NAGEL’S REDUCTIONIST SHADOW	175
	2. TEMPORALITY IN PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS	179
	2.1 Part-Whole Reductive Explanations	179
	2.2 Temporality	179
	3. COMPOSITION, CAUSATION, AND THE DIFFERENCE TIME MAKES	181
	3.1 Composition and Causation	181
	3.2 Intrinsicality and Fundamentality	182
	4. EXAMPLES: PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY AND PHYSICS	186
	4.1 Ideal Crystal	186
	4.2. Quantum-entanglement	187
	4.3 Protein Folding	188
	5. CONCLUSION	191
	REFERENCES	192
	THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST	195
	SOME HISTORICAL SCENE SETTING	195
	MISLEADING METAPHORS	200
	VARIATIONAL EXPLANATION AND FILTER DEVICES	204
	SOLVING SOBER’S PROBLEM	210
	REFERENCES	212
	THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST WHAT ?	215
	ABSTRACT	215
	1. INTRODUCTION: DOES SELECTION EXPLAIN THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST?	215
	2. THE SIEVE ANALOGY OF NATURAL SELECTION	216
	3. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SIEVE ANALOGY: A FALSE DICHOTOMY	220
	4. WHAT NATURAL SELECTION EXPLAINS AND WHAT IT DOES NOT	223
	REFERENCES	227
	Team C Philosophy of theCultural and Social Sciences	230
	NORMATIVITY IS THE KEY TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES	231
	1. WHERE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES IS NOT	231
	2. NORMATIVITY IN AN EXTERNAL AND AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE	234
	3. HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES DIFFER IN NORMATIVE INVOLVEMENT	236
	4. IS METHODOLOGICAL DUALISM COMPATIBLE WITH ONTOLOGICAL MONISM?	239
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	241
	METHODOLOGICAL HIGHER-LEVEL INTERDISCIPLINARITY BY SCHEME-INTERPRETATIONISM: AGAINST METHODOLOGICAL SEPARATISM OF THE NATURAL, SOCIAL, AND HUMAN SCIENCES	242
	I. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN THE INFORMATION- ANDSYSTEMS TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD	242
	II. THE TRADITIONAL “TWO CULTURES” PROBLEM	243
	III. TYPES OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY	244
	IV. TOWARDS A SYSTEMATIC SCHEME-INTERPRETATIONISM	247
	V. INTERPRETATION AND HERMENEUTICS	252
	EXPLANATION AND INTERPRETATION IN THE SCIENCES OF MAN	257
	EXPLANATION AS AN ACT OF COMMUNICATION	258
	EXPLANATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES	260
	INTERPRETATION IN CONTEXT	263
	CONCLUSION	267
	IMAGINATION AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY	268
	I. THE MOMENTS OF HISTORICAL MEMORY	269
	1. Personal Memory	269
	2. Interpretation of the Human Traces	270
	3. The Capacity for Storytelling	272
	4. The Connection of Personal Memory and Collective Memory	275
	II. NEW LIGHT ON EXPLANATION	276
	HISTORICAL NARRATIVES, EVIDENCE, AND EXPLANATIONS	279
	HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND EVIDENCE	279
	THE LOGIC OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE	282
	SCIENTIFIC LAWS AND COMMON SENSE GENERALIZATIONS	286
	HOLISTIC SOCIAL CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION	290
	I. INTRODUCTION	290
	II. INDIVIDUALISTIC VERSUS HOLISTIC PREDICATES AND CONCEPTS	291
	III. THE SOCIAL CAUSATION PROBLEM	294
	IV. ARGUING FOR HOLISTIC SOCIAL CAUSATION	298
	V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS	301
	COMPLEXITY IN ECONOMICS AND PREDICTION: THE ROLE OF PARSIMONIOUS FACTORS1	304
	1. SOURCES OF COMPLEXITY FOR ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS	305
	2. VARIETIES OF COMPLEXITY: FRAMEWORK AND DYNAMICS	306
	2.1. Complex Framework and Complex Dynamics	307
	2.2. Relevant Forms of Complexity	309
	3. THE ROLE OF PARSIMONIOUS FACTORS	310
	3.1. Identifi cation of Parsimonious Factors	311
	3.2. Contribution of Parsimonious Factors	313
	PREDICTION AND PRESCRIPTION IN THE SCIENCE OF THE ARTIFICIAL: INFORMATION SCIENCE AND COMPLEXITY1	316
	1. COMPLEXITY IN DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS	317
	1.1. Understanding the Complexity of a System	318
	1.2. Interaction in the System	319
	2. DIFFICULTIES FOR PREDICTION IN THE DESIGN OF INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS	321
	2.1. Kinds of Uncertainty	322
	2.2. Scientific Design and the Management of Uncertainty Problems	323
	3. THE NEED FOR PRESCRIPTION IN AN INFORMATIVE ENVIRONMENT	324
	3.1. Prescription in the “Inner” Level	324
	3.2. The “Outer” Sphere of Prescriptions	325
	Team D Philosophy of the Physical Sciences	329
	AGAINST POINTILLISME: A CALL TO ARMS	330
	ABSTRACT	330
	1 INTRODUCTION	330
	1.1 Five kinds of spatial extrinsicality	332
	2.1 Avoiding controversy about the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction	334
	2 THE WIDER CAMPAIGN AGAINST POINTILLISME	334
	2.1.1 Distinction from three mathematical distinctions	334
	2.2 Classical mechanics is not pointilliste	336
	2.2.1 Two versions of pointillisme	336
	2.2.2 Mechanics violates pointillisme as regards space	337
	3 STRESS: EXTRINSICALITY FROM A TENSOR’S ORDER	338
	3.1 The need for surface forces	339
	3.2 The stress tensor	340
	4 STRAIN: HAECCEITIST KINEMATICS	341
	4.1 The description of deformations	342
	4.2 The Cauchy-Green strain tensor	343
	5 ELASTICITY: FURTHER ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF EXTRINSICALITY	344
	6 CONCLUSION: YET MORE EXTRINSICALITY	345
	REFERENCES	346
	THE GIBBS PARADOX REVISITED	349
	ABSTRACT	349
	1 INTRODUCTION: THE GIBBS PARADOX	349
	2 THE GIBBS PARADOX IN STATISTICAL MECHANICS	350
	3 THE STATISTICAL MECHANICAL ENTROPY OF MIXING	352
	4 A NEW DILEMMA: THE GIBBS PARADOX IN QUANTUM MECHANICS	353
	5 HOW PARTICLES ARE TO BE REPRESENTED IN QUANTUM MECHANICS	355
	6 PARTICLES AS EMERGENT ENTITIES	357
	7 THE GIBBS PARADOX: CONCLUSION	358
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	359
	THE ALEXANDROFF PRESENT AND MINKOWSKI SPACETIME: WHY IT CANNOT DO WHAT IT HAS BEEN ASKED TO DO1	360
	1 SAVITT’S TWO MOTIVATIONS FOR HAVING A PRESENT IN MINKOWSKI SPACETIME	361
	2 ALEX’S FEATURES IN RELATION TO THE EXTENDED CHARACTER OF OUR EXPERIENCE	363
	3 ALEX’S OSCILLATION BETWEEN ITS USELESSNESS IN PHYSICS AND ITS UNFAITHFULNESS TO OUR EXPERIENCE	366
	4 THE PHYSICAL IRRELEVANCE OF ALEX	370
	5 ANOTHER MODEL OF THE PRESENT OF OUR EXPERIENCE?	372
	6 CONCLUSION	374
	A LOCUS FOR “NOW”	376
	ABSTRACT	376
	1 MAIN INTUITION	377
	1.1 Models of BST	380
	1.2 Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS)	382
	2 WHAT DO THE PRESENTS LOOK LIKE?	385
	3 DISCUSSION	387
	REFERENCES	390
	WEYL’S PRINCIPLE, COSMIC TIME AND QUANTUM FUNDAMENTALISM	392
	ABSTRACT	392
	1 INTRODUCTION	392
	2 A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF WEYL’S PRINCIPLE	393
	3 WEYL’S PRINCIPLE IN STANDARD TEXTS ON COSMOLOGY	396
	4 COSMIC TIME WITH QUANTUM MATTER?	401
	REFERENCES	404
	NOT THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATHWATER: BELL’S CONDITION OF LOCAL CAUSALITY MATHEMATICALLY ‘SHARP AND CLEAN’	406
	ABSTRACT	406
	I. INTRODUCTION	406
	II. THE INTUITIVE IDEA: BELL’S LOCAL CAUSALITY	407
	III. CLEANING UP THE INTUITIVE IDEA	411
	IV. INTRODUCING MATHEMATICS: FORMALIZING SUFFICIENCY	419
	V. THE BABY: BELL’S LOCAL CAUSALITY ‘MATHEMATICALLY SHARP AND CLEAN’	425
	VI. NOT THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATHWATER	426
	VII. ENVOI	430
	REFERENCES	430
	Team E History of the Philosophy of Science	432
	KANT ON CHANCE AND EXPLANATION	433
	1. INTRODUCTION	433
	2. KANT ON CHANCE	434
	3. THE CHANCE HYPOTHESIS	437
	4. WHY IS CHANCE ILLEGITIMATE?	439
	5. KANT ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD	441
	6. CONCLUSION	443
	SHIFTING THE (NON-RELATIVIZED) A PRIORI: HANS REICHENBACH ON CAUSALITY AND PROBABILITY (1915–1932)	444
	1. TWO SYNTHETIC APRIORIS: THE EARLY REICHENBACH	446
	2. YEARS OF TRANSITION: THE MID 1920S	447
	3. INDUCTIVE INFERENCE AS AN A PRIORI	452
	4. POST EMIGRATION: ABANDONING THE UNITY OF STATISTICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS	454
	CARNAP’S THEORIES OF CONFIRMATION	455
	THE RISE AND FALL OF FALSIFICATIONISM IN THE LIGHT OF NEURATH’S CRITICISM1	465
	1. INTRODUCTION	465
	2. THE CRITIQUE OF DOGMATIC FALSIFICATIONISM	467
	3. THE DECISIONISM OF POPPER1	470
	4. SOPHISTICATED FALSIFICATIONISM	472
	5. THE REJECTION OF THE MAIN IDEAS OF FALSIFICATIONISM	474
	6. CONCLUSION	476
	PROBABILITY AND PRAGMATISM	477
	1. FOREWORD	477
	2. ABOUT PRAGMATISM	477
	3. PEIRCE FORERUNNER OF THE PROPENSITY INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY	479
	4. THE INFLUENCE OF PRAGMATISM ON HANS REICHENBACH	480
	5. LEWIS’S INFLUENCE ON CARNAP	483
	6. THE SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY	484
	7. CONCLUDING REMARKS	487
	RUSSELL ON NON-DEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE	489
	INTRODUCTION	489
	1. THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION	491
	2. THE POSTULATES OF NON-DEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE	492
	3. KNOWLEDGE OF THE POSTULATES: HIGHER-ORDER NATURALISM?	494
	4. THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICISM	496
	EDGAR ZILSEL ON HISTORICAL LAWS	499
	“EVERY SYSTEM OF SCIENTIFIC THEORY INVOLVES PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS” (TALCOTT PARSONS). THE SURPRISING WEBERIAN ROOTS TO MILTON FRIEDMAN’S METHODOLOGY	511
	INTRODUCTION	511
	1. STIGLER’S INTEREST IN PARSONS	513
	2. PARSONS AND CHICAGO	517
	INDEX OF NAMES	522